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This paper revisits the important result of the real options approach to investment under uncer-
tainty, which states that increased uncertainty raises the value of waiting and thus decelerates
investment. Typically in this literature projects are assumed to be perpetual. However, in
today￿ s economy ￿rms face a fast-changing technology environment, implying that investment
projects are usually considered to have a ￿nite life. The present paper studies investment
projects with ￿nite project life, and we ￿nd that, in contrast with the existing theory, invest-
ments may be accelerated by increased uncertainty. It is shown that this particularly happens
when uncertainty is limited and project life is short.
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The standard theory of the real options approach to investment, as clearly explained in Dixit and
Pindyck (1994)1, states that uncertainty in combination with irreversibility creates a value of
the option to wait with undertaking capital investments. Over time more information becomes
available, which enables the decision maker to make better investment decisions at a later date.
As an illustration consider the following basic real options problem (Dixit and Pindyck
(1994, Ch. 6)), where a sunk investment cost, I, has to be incurred in return for a project
whose value, V (Q), is a function of stochastic revenue ￿ ow Q per time unit. Obviously, V (Q)
is increasing in Q. The simple net present value rule is to invest whenever Q exceeds Q0, where
V (Q0) = I. However, the optimal rule prescribes that investment is only optimal when V (Q) is
at least as large as a threshold value V (Q￿) that exceeds I: The di⁄erence between V (Q￿) and
I is caused by the value of waiting. It is shown that Q￿, and thus the value of waiting, goes up
with uncertainty. For this reason the general prediction of the real options literature is that a
higher level of uncertainty will have a negative e⁄ect on investment.
In this paper we revisit the conclusion that "a higher level of uncertainty will have a negative
e⁄ect on investment". To do so we adopt the standard framework with contingent claims
valuation of the investment opportunity and change it in one aspect: where the vast majority
of the real options literature assumes projects to be perpetual, we allow for the project life
to be ￿nite.2 Clearly, most, if not all, real-life investment projects have a ￿nite life. This is
especially true in today￿ s knowledge economy, in which innovations limit the economic lifetime
of technologies. Our main result is that the investment threshold decreases with uncertainty
in case uncertainty is limited and the project life is short. So, changing the project life from
in￿nite to ￿nite can imply a negative relationship between uncertainty and the value of waiting,
which reverses the basic real options result.
To be more precise, an increase in uncertainty a⁄ects the investment threshold in three
di⁄erent ways. The ￿rst e⁄ect is the discounting e⁄ect. An increase of uncertainty raises the
discount rate via the risk premium component. This reduces the net present value of the
investment and thus raises the investment threshold. The second e⁄ect is the volatility e⁄ect,
which a⁄ects the value of the option to wait positively: higher uncertainty increases the upside
potential payo⁄from the option, leaving the downside payo⁄unchanged at zero (since the option
will not be exercised at low payo⁄values). This increased option value implies that the ￿rm has
more incentive to wait, which also increases the investment threshold. The third e⁄ect of an
increase of uncertainty on the investment threshold is the convenience yield e⁄ect. The increase
of asset riskiness raises the discount rate and thus also the convenience yield of the investment
opportunity. This decreases the value of waiting, so that it is more attractive to invest earlier
resulting in a lower investment threshold.
1Some more recent contributions include studies of implications of learning (Decamps and Mariotti (2004),
Thijssen, Huisman and Kort (2006)), agency (Grenadier and Wang (2005)), business cycle (Guo, Miao and
Morellec (2005)), policy change (Pawlina and Kort (2005)), and implications to capital structure choices (Miao
(2005)), mergers and acquisitions dynamics (Morellec and Zhdanov (2005)), or exit strategies (Murto (2004)).
2Notably, Majd and Pindyck (1987) discuss some implications of ￿nite project life on real options modeling.
While they provide some arguments for the ￿nite project life assumption to be omitted, these considerations turn
out to play an important role in our analysis.
1The discounting and volatility e⁄ects thus raise the investment threshold, while the conve-
nience yield e⁄ect works in the opposite direction. It can be shown, and it is also intuitively
clear, that the size of the discounting e⁄ect is small in case of a short project life, while e⁄ect
two, the volatility e⁄ect, is small when uncertainty is limited. Consequently, it is possible for
the negative convenience yield e⁄ect to dominate the two other e⁄ects when the project life
is ￿nite and uncertainty is limited. In that case it thus holds that the investment threshold
decreases with uncertainty.
We examine the robustness of the non-monotonic e⁄ect of uncertainty on investment in the
case of a ￿nite project life by considering several variations of the problem. First, we show
that this result survives in case the opportunity to invest in the project is available only for a
limited amount of time. Next, we prove that this also holds for other relaxations of the in￿nite
project life assumption, like uncertain project duration, capital depreciation or catastrophe
risk. Furthermore, we ￿nd that general functional forms of the convenience yield preserve the
observed relationships.
The impact of uncertainty on investments has been of interest to economists for a long time.
One strand of literature relies on convex costs of capital adjustment and convexity of marginal
pro￿ts in prices. As shown by Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983), in such a setting uncertainty
hastens investment. The other important strand of literature, based on the real options the-
ory, acknowledges (partial) irreversibility of investments and predicts that uncertainty delays
investment. This paper veri￿es the latter prediction and shows that the investment trigger is
not necessarily increasing in uncertainty. Most closely related papers are Caballero (1991) and
Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996). Caballero (1991) considers a perfect competition setting with
convex adjustment costs, and he obtains that irreversibility does not lead to the usual negative
investment-uncertainty relationship. Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) assume that there are lags
between investment decisions and realizations. Firms have abilities to abandon uncompleted
projects in bad times, which creates a convexity in the output and value functions. Bar-Ilan
and Strange (1996) ￿nd that uncertainty may accelerate as well as decelerate investment de-
pending on speci￿c parameter values. Both papers have in common that they depart from the
conventional result of the real options literature, because the models create convexities in line
of Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983). Thus it comes with little surprise that in these papers
uncertainty may either accelerate or decelerate investment. The result of our paper is unique in
the sense that uncertainty may hasten irreversible investment without building on the convex-
ity of the marginal product of capital. Our model remains in the pure real options framework
and the reversal of the conventional result builds solely on the contingent claims valuation of
investment opportunities and the ￿nite capital lifetime. Moreover, since we only depart from
the standard real option framework by imposing a ￿nite lifetime, our model is more general
and is thus applicable to more investment situations than Caballero (1991) and Bar-Ilan and
Strange (1996).
A di⁄erent approach to study the relationship between uncertainty and irreversible invest-
ments is taken by Sarkar (2000). Sarkar analyzes the probability of investment taking place
within a certain time period and points at the fact that an increasing trigger does not auto-
matically mean that investment will be delayed. The di⁄erence with our result is that we show
2that increased uncertainty may not even lead to an increased trigger.
Beyond this introduction the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we consider
the model of the ￿nitely-lived project and derive the optimal investment trigger. Section 3
studies how uncertainty in￿ uences the investment decision. In Section 4 we discuss robustness,
while Section 5 concludes. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 The model and the optimal investment decision
The basic real options problem, extensively treated in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), considers the
problem of a single ￿rm considering investment in a perpetual project. The assumption of
a project having an in￿nite life is useful mostly due to its simplicity. However, in corporate
practice the investment projects are usually considered to have a ￿nite life. Certainly, in the
fast-changing technology environment that many businesses face, very few investment projects
are accurately approximated by the assumption of in￿nite life.
We thus consider an irreversible investment project with ￿nite life that can be undertaken
at any time. After the investment has taken place, the project generates a stochastic revenue
of Qt per unit time. Qt evolves exogenously according to a geometric Brownian motion
dQt = ￿Qtdt + ￿QtdZt; (1)
where dZ is the increment of a standard Wiener process, ￿ is the drift parameter and ￿ (> 0)
is the volatility parameter that introduces the uncertainty in our model. When the project is
undertaken, a one-time investment cost I is paid. For simplicity, the marginal costs are put
equal to zero.
The standard methods in real options theory to value an investment opportunity are dy-
namic programming and contingent claims valuation (Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). In this paper
we employ the latter approach. Compared to dynamic programming, the contingent claims ap-
proach o⁄ers a better treatment of the discount rate, because it is endogenously determined as
an implication of the overall equilibrium in capital markets. On the other hand, the contingent
claims approach requires that markets are su¢ ciently complete so that the project￿ s risk can be
spanned by traded assets. Making this assumption allows us to analyze the equilibrium impact
of the systematic risk on the discount rate and, further, on the value of the investment option
and the investment policy by using the intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of
Merton (1973).3 The CAPM formula relates the expected return of the project ￿, the risk-free
interest rate r, the correlation of the project return with the return of the market portfolio ￿,
and the market price of risk ￿ as follows:
￿ = r + ￿￿￿: (2)
The di⁄erence between ￿, the expected return of the project, and ￿, the expected rate
3The assumption that the CAPM holds is in accordance with the related literature. The CAPM brings a
linear relationship between the discount rate and ￿. In Section 4.3 we show that the results we present also hold
for more general discount rates functions. So other equilibrium asset pricing models would yield similar results
as long as the risk premium earned on an asset is increasing in the riskiness of the asset in a non-increasing rate.
3of change of Q, is referred to as the convenience yield (or return shortfall) of the investment
opportunity. The later is denoted by ￿ and satis￿es
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿: (3)
We assume that ￿ > 0, which ensures that the investment is ever undertaken; otherwise it is
never optimal to exercise the option.
The paper￿ s aim is to study the impact of the level of uncertainty ￿ on optimal investment
behavior. To to so, a special care must be taken in assigning endogenous variables. From (3)
we obtain that a change in ￿ results in a change of ￿, which must lead to an adjustment of
either ￿ or ￿ or both. In general, this relation depends on what is assumed to be an endogenous
parameter a⁄ected by changes in volatility. A certain guideline in this respect could be Pindyck
(2004), which relates commodity inventories, spot and future prices and the level of volatility.
The equilibrium in cash (spot transactions) and storage markets implies that both the spot
price and the convenience yield rise with the volatility, but the convenience yield is a⁄ected
more directly. The model is estimated for several commodities and the results show that in
particular the dynamics of the convenience yields are relatively well explained by changes in
volatility. Dynamic simulations of the model show that a volatility shock has a signi￿cant e⁄ect
on the convenience yield and only a small e⁄ect on the price. These ￿ndings suggest that in
our model it is more plausible to assume that ￿ (the convenience yield) rather than ￿ (the drift
of the revenue or of the commodity price) changes with ￿. Moreover, it also seems to be more
common in the related literature on the investment-uncertainty relationship to assume that ￿
is ￿xed and ￿ changes with ￿ (e.g. Sarkar (2000) and Sarkar (2003)). To sum up, in the context
of contingent claims valuation of real investment opportunities, the assumption of uncertainty
a⁄ecting the discount rate and convenience yield appears to be the most plausible one.
The value of the project V (Q) evolves over time and depends on the current realization of
Q. Upon installation the project value is equal to the expected present value of the revenue
stream discounted by the risk-adjusted discount rate. If the project has a ￿nite life of T years,
then the project value at the time of the investment is










r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
: (4)
Before the project is installed, the ￿rm holds an option to invest. The option is held until
the stochastic revenue ￿ ow reaches a su¢ ciently high level at which it is optimal to exercise the
option and invest. The option value F(Q) can be found by the replicating portfolio argument.
Employing the standard methods (cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) yields the di⁄erential equation
1
2
￿2Q2F00(Q) + (￿ ￿ ￿￿￿)QF0(Q) ￿ rF(Q) = 0: (5)
The general solution to (5) is given by
F(Q) = A1Q￿1 + A2Q￿2; (6)




￿2￿(￿ ￿ 1) + (￿ ￿ ￿￿￿)￿ ￿ r = 0; (7)
with ￿1 > 1 and ￿2 < 0. The unknown constants A1 and A2 together with the optimal
investment threshold Q￿ are determined by employing the following boundary conditions:
F(0) = 0; (8)
F(Q￿) = V (Q￿) ￿ I; (9)
F0(Q￿) = V 0 (Q￿): (10)
Condition (8) ensures that the option value will be zero if the revenues are zero (note that
from (1) it follows that zero is an absorbing barrier). As ￿2 in (6) is negative, for the option
value to go to zero as Q goes to zero, we need to impose A2 = 0. Equation (9) is the value
matching condition, which equates the value of the option at the exercise moment (at Q = Q￿)
to the net payo⁄the ￿rm receives. Condition (10) is the smooth pasting condition. Solving this
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From (11) the important result of the real options theory follows: Q￿ is higher than the level
of the revenue ￿ ow that would induce investment under the net present value (NPV) rule. In
the latter case the investment is undertaken as soon as the risk-adjusted project value exceeds
the investment cost, that is at the revenue level equal to
r+￿￿￿￿￿
1￿e￿(r+￿￿￿￿￿)T I. This value is always
lower than Q￿ in (11), as ￿1 > 1. So there are states where the expected payo⁄ of investment
is positive and the ￿rm chooses to wait and not to invest. The option to invest captures this
positive value of waiting.
3 The e⁄ects of uncertainty on the investment trigger
This section studies the e⁄ect of uncertainty on the value of waiting. First, we show that, as
usual, the value of waiting, re￿ ected in the level of investment trigger, always increases with
uncertainty when the project life is in￿nite or when discount rates are una⁄ected by uncertainty.
Second, if the equilibrium discount rate contains a positive risk premium, we derive that the
value of waiting decreases with uncertainty in case of ￿nite project lives and limited uncertainty.
Finally, we provide an economic analysis of these results.
3.1 Monotonicity results
We start out with the basic real options result for the investment project with in￿nite life.
5Proposition 1 If the project life is in￿nite, the investment trigger increases with uncertainty.
Hence, in case of an in￿nite project life the e⁄ect of uncertainty on the investment trigger is
unambiguously positive. This is the standard real options result, which says that the value of
waiting increases with uncertainty. This is re￿ ected by higher trigger values, because then the
revenue must reach a higher level before investment is optimally undertaken.
Now, let us move on to the ￿nite life project case. We ￿rst consider the scenario where the
impact of systematic risk is absent or not priced by the market. This implies that the discount
rate is constant, and requires that either the market price of risk is zero, ￿ = 0, or that the
correlation of the project return with the return of the market portfolio is zero, ￿ = 0.
Proposition 2 If the discount rate is constant, the relationship between the investment trigger
and uncertainty is always positive.
Proposition 2 states that, in the absence of the risk premium e⁄ect the investment trigger
always increases with uncertainty irrespective of the project lifetime, which is again the usual
real options result. It is important to point out, however, that the conditions necessary for
constant discount rates (￿ = 0 or ￿ = 0) are in general di¢ cult to accept in the context of
investment models; see discussions in e.g. Zeira (1990) and Sarkar (2003).
We can also show that in case of a negative risk premium (possible if either the correlation
of the project return with the return of the market portfolio or the market price of risk is
negative), the usual positive relationship arises.
Proposition 3 If ￿￿ < 0, then the relationship between the investment trigger and uncertainty
is always positive.
3.2 Non-monotonicity result
We proved in the previous subsection that both in the model with a project of in￿nite life
and in the model without or with negative risk premium, the impact of uncertainty on the
investment trigger is always positive. These are interesting special and limit cases; however, the
assumptions of Propositions 1 and 2 are serious abstractions from reality, and the negative risk
premium condition of Proposition 3 is a relatively rear phenomenon in the markets. Next, we
turn to the most common situation where the project life is ￿nite and the discount rate is set
in the capital market equilibrium with a positive risk premium. We now show that, the e⁄ect
on the trigger is no longer monotonic in uncertainty.
Proposition 4 If the project life is ￿nite and ￿￿ > 0, the uncertainty e⁄ect on the investment
trigger is non-monotonic: it decreases in ￿ for low levels of ￿ and then increases. The length
of the ￿-interval where the negative e⁄ect occurs, is negatively related to the project lifetime.
Figure 1 presents some numerical examples, where the parameter values correspond to earlier
work on the investment-uncertainty relationship, in particular to Sarkar (2000). We see that
indeed there is a negative relation between ￿ and Q￿ for lower values of ￿. The e⁄ect is more
pronounced for short-term projects, but even in the case of a 30-year project Q￿ decreases
6Figure 1: Investment trigger as a function of volatility for various project lenghts T and the set
of parameters: ￿ = 0:08, r = 0:1, ￿ = 0:7, ￿ = 0:4, I = 10.
until ￿ is around 0:12. The example shows that the positive e⁄ect of uncertainty on investment
(negative on the trigger) arises for economically relevant parameter values. The ￿gure, of course,
also con￿rms that for an in￿nitely long project the relation is monotonic and increasing in line
of the results in Proposition 1.
3.3 Economic analysis of the non-monotonicity result





1 ￿ e￿￿T I: (13)
At this point it is convenient to trace all the variables that are a⁄ected by uncertainty and
consider the trigger as a function of three parameters: Q￿ (￿;￿(￿);￿1(￿;￿(￿))). Then the




























The ￿rst term on the right-hand side measures the impact of revenue uncertainty on the
rate used to discount the project value. Rising uncertainty increases the discount rate, which
reduces the net present value of the investment project. This implies that it is less pro￿table
to invest in this project, which leads to an increase of the trigger value. Consequently, as is
straightforward to derive, the discounting e⁄ect is always positive.
7Since they both a⁄ect the trigger value via ￿1, the second and the third term of (14) re￿ ect
the in￿ uence of uncertainty on the value of the option to wait. Below we refer to these two e⁄ects





@￿ , captures the direct impact of uncertainty on the value of the option to wait.
Higher uncertainty increases the upside potential payo⁄ from the option, leaving the downside
payo⁄ unchanged at zero (since the option will not be exercised at low payo⁄ values). This is
the well-known positive impact of uncertainty on the option value. An increased option value
implies that the ￿rm has more incentive to wait. This raises the opportunity cost of investing







@￿ in (14) represents the impact of uncertainty on the option value
through the convenience yield. Increased uncertainty raises the risk premium of the expected
rate of return and thus also the convenience yield, which in turn elevates the opportunity cost
of holding the option and consequently decreases its value. For this reason it is attractive to
invest earlier, which reduces the trigger.
Summarizing, we conclude that the discounting and volatility e⁄ects are positive, while the
convenience yield e⁄ect is negative. The following proposition shows how the uncertainty level
and the project length in￿ uence the relative size of the three e⁄ects.
Proposition 5 (i) De￿ne ^ ￿ = f￿ : (￿1 ￿ 1)￿ ￿ ￿￿ = 0g. The combined option e⁄ect is nega-
tive at ￿ < ^ ￿ and positive at ￿ > ^ ￿.
(ii) The shorter is the project life T, the smaller is the discounting e⁄ect and the larger in
absolute terms are the two option e⁄ects.
The proposition states that the sign of the e⁄ect of uncertainty on the option value is
ambiguous but separable into two regions: a negative in￿ uence at relatively low uncertainty and
positive at relatively high uncertainty.4 The positive in￿ uence is governed by the volatility e⁄ect,
the size of which depends on the di⁄erences between the magnitudes of upside and downside
potential payo⁄s. This implies that the volatility e⁄ect is absent at ￿ = 0 and increasing in ￿.
On the other hand, the negative e⁄ect of uncertainty depends on its marginal impact on
the convenience yield. It exists for ￿ = 0, but it is vanishing at high ￿. To understand the
last point, note that the negative channel works through the discounted opportunity cost of
waiting. Since the discount factor is convex and decreasing in the discount rate and thus in
￿, the discount factor is almost constant and almost equal to zero at high ￿. Thus at high ￿
the discount factor is insensitive to ￿ and the e⁄ect of the convenience yield diminishes. For
these reasons it is not surprising that the proposition says that the negative in￿ uence of the
convenience yield e⁄ect dominates the positive in￿ uence of the volatility e⁄ect at relatively low
￿ and the opposite occurs at high ￿.
The proposition also states that the project- and option-related e⁄ects react di⁄erently to
changes in the project life. The discounting e⁄ect becomes smaller with shorter project lives.
Clearly, short-lived projects are relatively insensitive to marginal changes of the discount rate.
4From Proposition 5 (i) it is clear that in a setup where only the option e⁄ects are present, the non-monotonic
investment-uncertainty relationship would arise irrespective of the project lifetime. This could be the case for
example, if the project value V behaves according to geometric Brownian process. However such a setup is a
rather serious abstraction from reality (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994; 175) for arguments).
8￿ T = 10 T = 30
Q￿ (1) (2) (3) (4) Q￿ (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.00 5.52 7.47 0.00 -77.23 -69.77 2.22 8.38 0.00 -31.03 -22.65
0.02 4.44 5.95 1.19 -48.51 -41.37 1.87 6.86 0.50 -20.44 -13.08
0.04 3.77 5.01 2.15 -33.70 -26.54 1.66 5.92 0.95 -14.86 -8.00
0.06 3.34 4.39 2.99 -25.03 -17.65 1.54 5.29 1.38 -11.53 -4.86
0.08 3.05 3.97 3.75 -19.47 -11.75 1.46 4.88 1.80 -9.35 -2.67
0.10 2.86 3.68 4.40 -15.66 -7.57 1.43 4.60 2.20 -7.82 -1.02
0.12 2.74 3.49 4.95 -12.92 -4.48 1.42 4.43 2.57 -6.70 0.29
0.14 2.67 3.38 5.36 -10.90 -2.17 1.44 4.34 2.88 -5.86 1.36
0.16 2.65 3.31 5.65 -9.38 -0.42 1.47 4.30 3.15 -5.22 2.22
0.18 2.65 3.28 5.85 -8.24 0.90 1.53 4.30 3.37 -4.74 2.93
0.20 2.68 3.28 5.99 -7.37 1.91 1.59 4.34 3.55 -4.37 3.52
0.22 2.73 3.31 6.09 -6.70 2.69 1.67 4.39 3.72 -4.09 4.02
0.24 2.79 3.34 6.17 -6.19 3.32 1.75 4.46 3.87 -3.89 4.45
Table 1: The three e⁄ects of uncertainty a⁄ecting the position of the investment trigger for the
set of parameters: ￿ = 0:08, r = 0:1, ￿ = 0:7, ￿ = 0:4, I = 10, Q = 1. The columns present:
the discounting e⁄ect (1), the volatility e⁄ect (2), the convenience yield e⁄ect (3), and the total
e⁄ect (4).
On the other hand, the option-related e⁄ects increase with shorter project lives. A shorter
project life implies that the current revenue ￿ ow needs to larger for the investment to be
optimal. This implies that also the option e⁄ects are enlarged.
Now we are ready to establish when and why increasing uncertainty may lower the invest-
ment threshold. First we note that if the combined option e⁄ect is positive, that is ￿ > ^ ￿,
the overall e⁄ect is always positive. Furthermore, the combined option e⁄ect is negative for
￿ = 0 and remains so for relatively small levels of uncertainty. Then the convenience yield
e⁄ect determines the sign of the combined option e⁄ect. For the negative combined option
e⁄ect to dominate the positive impact of the discounting e⁄ect, the project must be relatively
short-lived, as was argued in the previous paragraph. We conclude that the overall e⁄ect of
uncertainty on the investment trigger is positive when uncertainty is small and project life is
short.
These mechanisms are illustrated in a numerical example presented in Table 1. It allows
for a closer inspection of the magnitude of the e⁄ects of uncertainty a⁄ecting the position of
the investment trigger. The volatility and convenience yield e⁄ects increase with shortening
the project life. The discounting e⁄ect decreases with smaller T. The combined option e⁄ect is
negative but increasing in ￿ (it becomes positive for ￿ > ^ ￿ = 0:241). The longer the project life,
the faster is the negative convenience yield e⁄ect o⁄set by the positive impact of the discounting
and volatility e⁄ects. If T = 10, the total e⁄ect is negative for ￿ between 0 and 0:16; while for
T = 30 the total e⁄ect remains negative for ￿ between 0 and 0:10.
It should be noted that the project value is una⁄ected by the revenue uncertainty if the
discount rate, and thus the convenience yield, is constant (i.e. if ￿￿ = 0). In this case both
the discounting e⁄ect of uncertainty and also the convenience yield e⁄ect are absent. From
Proposition 5 it can be seen that ￿￿ = 0 implies that ^ ￿ = 0, so that we have a positive option
e⁄ect for all levels of uncertainty. Therefore, increasing uncertainty directly raises the option
9value and, consequently, the investment trigger through the volatility e⁄ect. This explains the
di⁄erence between the results of Propositions 2 and 4.
4 Robustness
The model of the previous sections was geared to show our results in the simplest setting. The
aim of this section is to demonstrate that our main result, i.e. the value of waiting decreases
with uncertainty in case of a short project life and a limited amount of uncertainty, can be
generalized. First we consider a scenario where the investment opportunity is available only for
a limited amount of time. After that we analyze the case where the project has an uncertain
duration. The latter case is interesting also because it allows for alternative interpretations,
such as depreciation or catastrophe risk. Finally, we consider more general, thus not necessary
linear, convenience yield functions in uncertainty.
4.1 Finite-life option
We now assume that the project and the option to invest both have ￿nite durability.5 The
project life is T years and its value V (Q) is given by equation (4). Denote the life length of the
option as TF. Since the option expires at TF, its value F(Q;t) depends on calendar time t. To
￿nd the di⁄erential equation de￿ning the option value we follow the same steps as in Section 2.
The resulting partial di⁄erential equation includes the time derivative and is given by
1
2
￿2Q2FQQ + (￿ ￿ ￿￿￿)QFQ + Ft ￿ rF = 0: (15)
The option value must satisfy the terminal condition at the expiry date TF :
F(Q;TF) = max(V (Q) ￿ I;0);
which states that at t = TF the option is exercised (the investment is undertaken) if the project￿ s
expected present value exceeds the investment cost. The option satis￿es also the boundary
conditions at Q = 0 and Q = Q￿ similar to the ones used in Section 2:
F(0;t) = 0;
F(Q￿;t) = V (Q￿) ￿ I;
FQ(Q￿;t) = V 0 (Q￿):
Unlike in the previous problem, in which Q￿ was a single point, here the optimal investment
trigger Q￿(t) is a function of time:
The problem we have to solve is analogous to the valuation of American-style options with
a ￿nite expiry date, to which no closed-form solutions exist. We solve equation (15) together
with the boundary conditions using standard ￿nite-di⁄erence numerical methods.
5Note that McDonald and Siegel (1986) also allow for a ￿nite life of the investment opportunity, but their
project is implicitly perpetual.
10Figure 2: Project and option with ￿nite life: Boundary investment trigger, Q￿(￿F), for various
levels of volatility and the set of parameters: ￿ = 0:08, r = 0:1, ￿ = 0:7, ￿ = 0:4, I = 10;
T = 10, TF = 10.
Figures 2 and 3 present our results for the optimal investment trigger boundary Q￿(t). We
assumed the option life TF to be 10 years and the project life T to be either 10 years (Figure
2), or perpetual (Figure 3). All other parameters are as in the numerical example of Figure 1.
The triggers Q￿(t) are drawn for various levels of ￿ ranging from 0:10 to 0:30. The horizontal
axis depicts the remaining option life ￿F, de￿ned as ￿F ￿ TF ￿t (at ￿F = 0 the option to invest
expires).
As expected, the right-hand-side of both ￿gures at ￿F = TF = 10 is well approximated
by the model with a perpetual real option, so that the trigger boundary values are very close
to those in Figure 1 (T = 10 and T = 1 curves). At ￿F = 0, when the investment decision
becomes a now-or-never decision, all curves are at the values implied by the NPV investment
rule.
Figure 2 clearly con￿rms our result that a ￿nite project life may cause the real option
investment rule to be non-monotonic in uncertainty. An increase of ￿ from 0:10 to 0:15 moves
the curve downwards.6 But an increase of ￿ from 0:20 to 0:25 and 0:30 shifts the optimal triggers
upwards. The important ￿nding of this numerical analysis is that after comparing Figure 2 and
Figure 1, we can conclude that the levels of ￿ at which the trigger decreases and increases with
uncertainty, remain roughly the same. In both cases the revenue uncertainty level at which the
change of sign occurs lies between ￿ = 0:15 and ￿ = 0:20. Thus the ￿nite-life option assumption
neither mitigates nor augments the positive relationship between investment and uncertainty
due to the decreasing trigger.
Figure 2 shows also that the e⁄ect of uncertainty may di⁄er depending on the remaining
6Except at the expiry date ￿F = 0, at which Q
￿(t) increases in ￿ for all ￿.
11Figure 3: A perpetual project and a ￿nitely-lived option to invest: Boundary investment trigger,
Q￿(￿F), for various levels of volatility and the set of parameters: ￿ = 0:08, r = 0:1, ￿ = 0:7,
￿ = 0:4, I = 10; T = 1, TF = 10.
option life. The dashed curve of ￿ = 0:15 is below the dot-marked curve of ￿ = 0:25 at high ￿F
and above at low ￿F. The reason is the nearly ￿ at horizontal shape of the optimal investment
trigger curve at relatively low ￿ (￿ = 0:10 or ￿ = 0:15) for most of the option life and a sudden
drop close to ￿F = 0. This shape may be caused by the convenience yield being low at lower ￿;
implying that there is only a small gain of undertaking the investment early (recall that a call
option is never prematurely exercised if the convenience (dividend) yield is zero).
The behavior of the investment boundary in Figure 2 can be contrasted with the case of
the perpetual project. Figure 3 shows that when the project life is in￿nite then Q￿(t) moves
upwards with increasing uncertainty. This is the usual monotonic relation consistent with the
model with perpetual opportunity to invest.
4.2 Stochastic project life
An alternative for assuming a deterministic ￿nite project life is to impose that a Poisson arrival
brings the project to an end. We study this here and assume that the project lifetime (after
installation) follows a Poisson process with rate ￿.







r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿e￿￿tdt =
Q
r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿
:
The resulting formula prompts other economic interpretations of a stochastic project life. It
is equivalent to the assumption of a perpetual project that is exponentially depreciated with
rate ￿ (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994), p.200). In yet another interpretation, ￿ may represent a
12Figure 4: Investment trigger as a function of volatility for various Poisson arrival rates ￿ and
the set of parameters: ￿ = 0:08, r = 0:1, ￿ = 0:7, ￿ = 0:4, I = 10.
catastrophe risk that may hit the whole economy or sector or an individual ￿rm.




(r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿)I: (16)
We can now show that the non-monotonic uncertainty e⁄ect carries over to the case of a sto-
chastic project life.
Proposition 6 If ￿ > 0 and ￿￿ > 0, then the uncertainty e⁄ect on the investment trigger
is non-monotonic: it decreases in ￿ for low levels of ￿ and then increases. The length of the
￿-interval where the negative e⁄ect occurs, increases ￿.
This result points out how strongly the monotonic relationship between the investment
trigger and uncertainty hinges on the assumption of the project being perpetual. If there exists
just a small probability that the project will be ￿nished in ￿nite time, the investment trigger
will be decreasing with increasing uncertainty for a small enough ￿. To illustrate this result, a
numerical example is presented in Figure 4. Here we indeed see that even a very small ￿ causes
the trigger to decrease in uncertainty at small but realistic levels of uncertainty.
4.3 General convenience yield
The previous results stated in Propositions 1-6 are obtained for the framework of Section 2 (and
Section 4.2 in the stochastic life case). In that model, the equilibrium discount rate, and also
the convenience yield, are determined by the standard CAPM and thus linear on ￿. Here we
check whether this linearity is crucial for the results that we obtained. This issue is relevant as,
13apart from the standard CAPM, there exist theory and some evidence in favour of nonlinearity.
For example, it is well-known that the presence of ￿nite heterogeneous investment horizons
leads to a nonlinear CAPM with a nonlinear relationship between returns and risk (see, e.g.,
Lee, Wu and Wei (1990)). Moreover, there is a growing literature on factor pricing models with
nonlinearities (see Bansal and Viswanathan (1993)).
Let the convenience yield be a non-decreasing, continuous, twice di⁄erentiable function of
uncertainty ￿(￿) for ￿ ￿ 0. In the previous sections we obtained results for the linear case
, i.e. ￿00(￿) = 0. We now show propositions that generalize those results. Corresponding to
Proposition 1 we have that
Proposition 7 If the project life is in￿nite and ￿0(￿) ￿ 0, then the investment trigger increases
with uncertainty.
Proposition 2 is, of course, as general as one can get in terms of ￿(￿). Proposition 4 can be
generalized as follows.
Proposition 8 If the project life is ￿nite, ￿0(￿) > 0, and ￿00(￿) ￿ 0, then the uncertainty
e⁄ect on the investment trigger is non-monotonic: it decreases in ￿ for low levels of ￿ and then
increases. The length of the ￿-interval where the negative e⁄ect occurs, decreases with project
lifetime.
So in the case of a ￿nite project life, the previously observed properties for linear ￿(￿) carry
over to a concave ￿(￿). In case of a convex ￿(￿), we can have either a U-shaped relationship
and a monotonic one.7
5 Conclusions
Our paper shows that a ￿nite life of an investment project in combination with a risk premium in
expected rates of return may reverse of the usual e⁄ect of uncertainty on irreversible investments.
In particular, we determined a scenario under which increased uncertainty reduces the value of
waiting with investment. We now brie￿ y discuss some implications of this result.
In corporate practice investment projects are usually considered to have a ￿nite life, which
supports the importance of our result. It thus seems that assuming the project life to be in￿nite,
which is done in the overwhelming majority of real options contributions, is useful for simplicity
reasons but dangerous since adverse uncertainty e⁄ects are lost.
From a policy point of view our results demonstrate that there exists a positive level of
uncertainty at which the investment trigger admits its lowest value. If the policy aim is to
increase investment, then the implication is that it is not necessarily optimal in all cases to
decrease the level of uncertainty of policy instruments. However, any speci￿c recommendation
may be a bit far-reaching in the current single-￿rm model with a general source of uncertainty.
To derive policy implications out of our non-monotonic investment-uncertainty relationship
deserves a separate study. Similarly, in order to focus on the main features of the described
7To check it, take, for instance, ￿(￿) = r + ￿￿￿
3=2 ￿ ￿ with the parameter values as in Table 1 and the
uncertainty e⁄ect is U-shaped. However, if ￿(￿) = r + ￿￿￿
3 ￿ ￿; the e⁄ect of uncertainty is always positive.
14mechanism, we have not attempted to construct a richer model of industry equilibrium. This
can be done by considering a competitive industry (as in Caballero and Pindyck (1996) and
others) or imperfect competition (as in Smets (1991), Grenadier (1996) and others). However,
we are quite con￿dent that, qualitatively spoken, our result carries over to these frameworks.
Our non-monotonicity result accords with empirical ￿ndings of Bo and Lensink (2005).
In a panel of Dutch ￿rms, the investment-uncertainty relationship is positive at low levels
of uncertainty and negative at high levels. Until now, a clear theoretical explanation for such
empirical results is missing. The factors hastening investment with greater uncertainty indicated
in this paper lend themselves to empirical tests.
A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Deterministic project life












+ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
1
1 ￿ e￿(r+￿￿￿￿￿)T (M ￿ N￿); (17)
where






￿￿￿2 + (￿1 ￿ 1)(r ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿1 (￿ ￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿ ￿ r￿￿;






￿￿￿2 + (￿1 ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿;










+ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ = @L0=@￿j￿=￿1 > 0, as the derivative is evaluated at the higher
root of the convex quadratic L0). The sign of L1 thus determines for the sign of the derivative.
From (7) we observe that



















2 ￿￿￿2 + (r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿)￿￿: (19)































+ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
[(￿1 ￿ 1)￿ (r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿)]
￿ 0;
where the ￿rst inequality stems from the observation that 1
2(￿1 + 1) > 1 and the second from
the assumption that r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿ > 0.
The two other possibilities ￿￿ = 0 and ￿￿ < 0 are covered by the proofs of Propositions 2
and 3, respectively.
Proof of Proposition 2. Within our model we can impose absence of the impact of systematic
risk by setting ￿ = 0: The derivative of the investment trigger (given in equation (11)) with














1 ￿ e￿(r￿￿)T (￿1 ￿ 1)￿ (r ￿ ￿)
The resulting expression is always positive if r > ￿, which holds by the assumption that ￿ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that ￿￿ < 0. Then the assumption that ￿ > 0 holds if
and only if ￿ 2 [0; ￿ ￿), where ￿ ￿ =
￿￿r
￿￿ . We have that, denoting ￿(￿) and ￿1(￿) as functions of ￿,
￿(￿ ￿) = 0 and ￿1(￿ ￿) = 1. So [0; ￿ ￿) is the relevant domain for ￿ in this case. Next, we claim that
1
2
(￿1 + 1)￿ < ￿ ￿, for all ￿ 2 [0; ￿ ￿): (20)
To verify, note that d
d￿
1






+ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿1 ￿1




2 (￿1(￿ ￿) + 1) ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿. So, for positive ￿ less than ￿ ￿, the inequality (20) is true.
Now, ￿￿ < 0 implies that N < 0. Combining (20) and (18) we have that





(￿1 + 1)￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
> (￿1 ￿ 1)￿ (r + ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) = (￿1 ￿ 1)￿￿(￿ ￿) = 0:
Since M > 0, N < 0, and 1 ￿ ￿ > 0, the derivative (17) is also positive and the proposition is
proved.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that T is ￿nite and ￿￿ > 0. We want to show that L1 is
negative for low ￿ ￿ 0 and becomes positive when ￿ increases. First, it is useful to observe the




16It can also be veri￿ed that




Then note that at ￿ = 0, L1 = ￿(r ￿ ￿)￿￿￿ < 0. So
dQ￿
d￿ is also negative at ￿ = 0. As ￿
increases, ￿ converges to zero and L1 becomes positive. We show now that L1 changes its sign




































￿ + ￿1 ￿ 1
￿
f(￿1 ￿ 1)[￿￿ ￿ (￿1 ￿ 1)￿]￿ + ￿g
> 0; (23)
The inequalities follow from (21) and (22). So L1 always increases in ￿ if L1 = 0. Now,
continuity of L1 implies that it changes its sign only once from negative to positive at some
￿￿ > 0. Hence the ￿rst part of the proposition is proved.
To verify that the ￿-interval where the negative e⁄ect occurs is larger the shorter is the






















The inequality follows from the fact that d￿
dT < 0 and (23).























+ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
: (24)




+ r ￿ ￿(￿) > 0, the sign of expression (24) depends on the sign of
L2 ￿ (￿1 ￿ 1)￿ ￿ ￿￿ in the way stated in the proposition.
It remains to be shown that there exists a unique non-negative ^ ￿: Note that, if ￿￿ > 0, at
￿ = 0 we have that L2 = ￿￿￿ < 0 and the combined option e⁄ect is negative. To verify that
the option e⁄ect changes its sign only once from negative to positive with increasing ￿, we show




￿￿￿ ￿ (￿1 ￿ 1)￿2
￿2(￿1 ￿ 1) + ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
+ ￿1 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ 1 > 0;
if L2 ￿ 0.








1 ￿ e￿￿(￿)T ￿ ￿(￿)Te￿￿(￿)T
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿(￿)T￿2 ￿￿;











@￿ decrease in absolute terms in T.
17A.2 Stochastic project life
Let ￿(￿) be a continuous twice di⁄erentiable convenience yield function. The derivative of Q￿



















2 ￿0(￿)￿2 + (￿1 ￿ 1)￿(￿)￿ +
￿
(￿1 ￿ 1)￿ ￿ ￿0(￿)
￿
￿: (26)
The ￿rst two fractions of the right-hand side of (25) are always positive, so the sign of the
derivative is determined by the sign of L3.
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof follows from the proof of Proposition 8 below with linear
￿(￿).
We prove Propositions 7 and 8 only for stochastic project lifetime; similar proofs can be
obtained for the deterministic case.
Proof of Proposition 7. Note that if ￿ = 0 and ￿0(￿) > 0 then L3 = 1
2 (￿1 ￿ 1)
2 ￿0(￿)￿2 +
(￿1 ￿ 1)￿(￿)￿ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. We want to show that for ￿ > 0 and ￿0(￿), L3 is negative for low
￿ ￿ 0 and turns to positive with increasing ￿. First we note that at ￿ = 0, L3 = ￿￿0(0)￿ < 0.
Then observe that a straightforward consequence of (26) is that











(￿1 ￿ 1)￿0(￿)￿2 + ￿ (￿(￿) + ￿)
￿



















(￿1 ￿ 1)￿ (￿(￿) + ￿)
￿
￿00(￿) > 0:
So L3 always increases in ￿ if L3 ￿ 0. From the continuity of L3 now follows that L3 changes
its sign only once from negative to positive at some ￿￿ > 0. This proves the ￿rst part of
proposition.
To verify that the ￿-interval where the negative e⁄ect occurs is larger, the shorter is the





















where for the inequality we employ (27) and the ￿rst part of the proof of this proposition
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